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Abstract—Adversarial attacks against Deep Neural Networks
have been widely studied. One significant feature that makes
such attacks particularly powerful is transferability, where the
adversarial examples generated from one model can be effective
against other similar models as well. A large number of works
have been done to increase the transferability. However, how to
decrease the transferability and craft malicious samples only for
specific target models are not explored yet.
In this paper, we design novel attack methodologies to generate
adversarial examples with controllable non-transferability. With
these methods, an adversary can efficiently produce precise
adversarial examples to attack a set of target models he desires,
while keeping benign to other models. The first method is
Reversed Loss Function Ensemble, where the adversary can
craft qualified examples from the gradients of a reversed loss
function. This approach is effective for the white-box and gray-
box settings. The second method is Transferability Classification:
the adversary trains a transferability-aware classifier from the
perturbations of adversarial examples. This classifier further
provides the guidance for the generation of non-transferable
adversarial examples. This approach can be applied to the black-
box scenario. Evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness
and efficiency of our proposed methods. This work opens up a
new route for generating adversarial examples with new features
and applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed the revolutionary development
of Deep Learning (DL) technology. A variety of DL algorithms
and Deep Neural Network (DNN) models are designed to
enable many artificial intelligent tasks, especially in the safety-
and security-critical domains, e.g., autonomous driving, security
authentication, intrusion detection, etc. As a result, DL models
are expected to meet high requirements of robustness and
security. Unfortunately, DNNs are well-known to be vulnerable
to adversarial examples (AEs): with imperceptible modifications
to the input sample, the model will be fooled to give wrong
prediction results. Since its discovery in 2013 [1], a large
amount of efforts have been spent to launch and heat the arms
race between the adversarial attacks and defenses.
Adversarial examples enjoy one important feature: transfer-
ability [1]. AEs generated from one model has certain probabil-
ity to fool other models as well. Due to this transferability, it
becomes feasible for an adversary to attack black-box models,
as he can generate AEs from an alternative white-box model
and then transfer it to the target model. As a result, extensive
works have been focusing on increasing AE’s transferability [2],
[3], [4], explaining the mechanism and effects of transferability
[5], [6], [7], [8], and trying to attack in real world[9].
Different from those studies, we aim to explore how to
decrease the transferability and generate AEs only for certain
DL models desired by the adversary. Generating AEs with such
controllable non-transferability can enable the adversary to
precisely attack his targets without affecting other irrelevant or
his own applications. For instance, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs)
adopt state-of-the-art DNN models for objection recognition
and motion planning. A malicious AV vendor may want to
attack its competitor’s products. He can generate AEs only
for the target model, and physically install them in the real-
world scenarios. Then the vehicles from its rival company will
malfunction when meeting the AEs, while its own vehicles
can behave correctly.
There are two challenges towards this goal. First, transfer-
ability is a nature feature for AEs. It is hard to efficiently
craft AEs to minimize their damages on specific protected
models, while still maintaining high success rate on specific
target models. Second, we need to consider different attack
settings. When the adversary has little knowledge about the
details and parameters of target or protected models, it is also
difficult for him to generate accurate AEs to achieve his goal.
To the best of our knowledge, there is currently only one study
about this non-transferability feature [10]. However, this work
only considers the white-box setting. The generated AEs are
not controllable: the attack aims to decrease the transferability
over all models instead of some specific protected ones. Beside,
it is unknown whether this approach is applicable to models
with different structures.
In this work, we propose two attack methodologies to gen-
erate adversarial examples with controllable non-transferability.
The first one is Reversed Loss Function Ensemble, for the white-
box or gray-box attack settings. We design a new loss function
which considers the impacts of both the target models, and the
protected models (in a reversed fashion). Optimization of this
loss function can give very precise AEs with success rates of
higher than 95% on the target models, and lower than 1% on
the protected models. The second solution is Transferability
Classification, for the black-box attack setting. We find that
the the adversarial perturbations with different transferability
results have distinct characteristics. Based on this observation,
we build a transferability-aware classifier, and generate AEs
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efficiently from it to meet our demands. The adversary can
reduce the non-transferability across different models as low as
12%, even he has very limited knowledge about those models.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Generating AEs with High Transferability
The transferability feature of AEs was first identified with
the L-BFGS method in [1]. Since then, a number of works
have been done to increase the transferability of the gradient-
based methods for AE generation. MI-FGSM [2] adopted
momentum optimization in the process of gradient generation
to enhance the transferability. This helps it win the 1st place in
both targeted and untargeted adversarial attack competitions of
NeurIPS2017. DI2-FGSM [4] applied random transformations
to the input at each iteration of AE generation to achieve high
success rate on black-box models. TI-FGSM [3] enhanced
the transferability of AEs towards the models with adversarial
defenses. It identified the region which is less sensitive to white-
box models but more sensitive to the target model, and adopted
a pretrained matrix kernel to handle the gradients. These three
methods are all based on FGSM, and can be combined to
further improve the transferability. TAP [11] maximized the
distance between clean samples and the corresponding AEs in
the intermediate feature map, and adopted smooth regularization
to improve the success rates on both white-box and black-box
models.
B. Explanation and Understanding of Transferability
There are different points of view to understand the mech-
anism of transferability. The first one is from the model
decision boundary. Liu et al. [12] proposed that transferability
is caused by the similarity of decision boundaries of different
models, even they have different network structures. An
AE that can cross the boundary of one model has certain
probability to cross the boundaries of other models as well.
Tramer et al. [13] extended this hypothesis with the concept
of adversarial subspace. Models with a higher-dimensional
adversarial subspace have higher probabilities to coincide, thus
the transferability is higher. The second perspective is from
the data features. Ilyas et al. [14] proposed the concept of
non-robust features that can be leveraged for AE generation.
Different models for the same task can utilize similar non-
robust features. As a result, AEs constructed from those features
can be transferred across each other. The third direction is to
identify the factors that can affect the transferability. Wu et
al. [7] discovered that models with similar architecture, lower
capability and high test accuracy have higher transferability.
Papernot et al. [15] pointed out that transferability is not only
limit to neural networks. They exist in statistic machine learning
models (e.g., logistic regression, SVM, KNN, decision tree) as
well.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND THREAT MODEL
We aim to generate adversarial examples that can accurately
fool a specific set of DL models, while remaining inoffensive
to another set of models. Formally, we consider two sets of
DL models: Mattack and Mprotect. All models in these two
sets are used for the same task, but with different parameters,
network structures or configurations. Given an input sample x,
our goal is to identify imperceptible perturbations δ to satisfy
the following properties:
fi(x+ δ) 6= fi(x), ∀fi ∈Mattack (1a)
fi(x+ δ) = fi(x), ∀fi ∈Mprotect (1b)
For the models in Mattack, we consider an untargeted attack,
where the misclassified label can be an arbitrary one different
from the correct one. Targeted attacks can be conducted in
a similar way. Our solutions are general-purpose and can be
combined with various AE generation algorithms (e.g., FGSM
[16], C&W [17], DeepFool [18]). How to design novel attack
algorithms to evade state-of-the-art defenses is out of the scope
of this paper.
We consider three typical attack scenarios [19]. For each
scenario, we propose a attack method to meet our goal. (1)
White-box attack: the adversary knows every detail about each
model including all the parameters. We introduce a Reversed
Loss Function Ensemble (RLFE) method to generate adversarial
examples (Section IV-A). (2) Gray-box attack: the adversary
knows all details of the models (e.g., training algorithms,
network topology, hyper-parameters) except the parameters.
He can train shadow models with the same configurations,
and then apply the RLFE method on the shadow models to
generate adversarial examples and attack the target models
(Section IV-B). (3) Black-box attack: the adversary does not
have any knowledge about the target models. This is the most
restricted adversarial setting. We introduce a novel method,
Transferability Classification (TC) to generate high-quality
adversarial examples only by querying the black-box models
(Section V).
IV. METHOD 1: REVERSED LOSS FUNCTION ENSEMBLE
A. Attacking White-box Models
We first consider a white-box setting, where the adversary
has full knowledge of the models inMattack andMprotect. This
scenario occurs when the model owners adopt the DL models
published online for free use. The adversary can calculate the
gradients of the model parameters to generate precise non-
transferable adversarial examples.
Recall that the generation of adversarial examples for one
target model f can be formulated as an optimization problem
in Equation 2(a). To solve this problem, one typical approach is
to maximize the loss function in Equation 2(b), where 〈f(x)〉j
denotes the confidence score of the j-th output, and y denotes
the correct label of x.
minimize ‖δ‖, subject to f(x+ δ) 6= f(x) (2a)
L(f, x, y) = −〈f(x)〉y + log
∑
j 6=y
exp 〈f(x)〉j
 (2b)
We introduce Reversed Loss Function Ensemble (RLFE) to
handle multiple models from the attacked model set Mattack
and protected model set Mprotect. Specifically, we ensemble
the loss function from each model into a combined function
(Equation 3): the attacked models positively contribute to the
total loss while the protected models have negative impacts on
this function. By maximizing this loss function, the identified
adversarial examples are guaranteed to mislead the attacked
models while hardly affecting the outputs of the protected
models.
L∗ =
∑
fi∈Mattack
λi · L(fi, x, y)−
∑
fj∈Mprotect
λj · L(fj , x, y)
(3)
It is worth noting that RLFE is very accurate since the
adversary has white-box accesses to the models’ parameters and
generates the precise perturbations on those models. So even the
attacked and protected models have very minor differences, the
adversary is still able to discover examples that can distinguish
them. This is hard to achieve in gray-box or black-box scenarios,
due to the limited adversarial capabilities.
B. Attacking Gray-box Models
Next we consider the gray-box setting, where the adversary
knows the training details and configurations of the models, but
not the parameter values. This is the scenario when the model
owner adopts the public DL algorithms or cloud services to
train his own copy of models.
In this case, the adversary cannot directly employ RLFE
to calculate the adversarial perturbations due to the lack of
model parameters. Instead, he can first construct shadow models
with the same algorithms and configurations to mimic the
behaviors of the actual models. Then he can generate the
adversarial examples using RLFE over the shadow models.
These examples can be used to attack or protect the original
models as well. Note that this solution can also be applied
to the case where some of the models are white-box to the
adversary while the rest are gray-box. The adversary only needs
to construct the shadow models of the gray-box ones and use
the parameters of white-box models directly when generating
adversarial examples.
It is interesting that we utilize the transferability between
shadow and actual models to generate non-transferable AEs
between attacked and protected models. As a result, the quality
of adversarial examples depends on two factors. The first
factor is the similarity between the shadow models and actual
models. A higher similarity can improve the transferability
between the constructed shadow and actual models, making the
results closer to the whit-box setting. Various model extraction
techniques [20], [21], [22], [23] have been proposed, which
can be leveraged by the adversary to build the shadow models.
The adversary can use the same or similar training set to train
replicas of the actual model to achieve the same performance.
He can also synthesize a dataset by querying the actual model
with certain samples, and use the confidence scores as the
output. This has been demonstrated more effective and efficient
[23].
Fig. 1: Overview of our methodology
The second factor is the distinction between the attacked and
protected models. If the attacked and protected models have
very similar behaviors and features (e.g., originating from the
same training algorithms and settings), it is hard to construct
shadow models to differentiate them. This is one limitation
in the gray-box setting, due to the restricted capability. The
more distinct are the structures of the attacked models from
the protected ones, the more effective our approach will be.
V. METHOD 2: TRANSFERABILITY CLASSIFICATION
Finally we consider the black-box scenario. Now the
adversary does not have knowledge about the protected and
attacked models, and cannot construct shadow models and then
apply RLFE. We only assume the adversary can query those
black-box models, i.e., sending arbitrary input and retrieving
the corresponding output. One straightforward way is to keep
generating adversarial examples and testing their transferability
until a qualified one is discover. This brute force method
is not efficient since for each sample, the adversary has to
try a lot of sessions before obtaining a good one. Instead,
we aim to build a generator, that can produce the desired
adversarial perturbations corresponding to a given input easily
and promptly. To achieve this goal, we propose a novel method,
Transferability Classification, which could precisely capture
the transferability information between two models.
It has been demonstrated that the transferability of AEs is
caused by the common non-robust features that are learned by
different models [14]. Inspired by this, we further find that the
non-transferability could also be controlled by identifying some
specific features learned by one model but not by others. The
key insight of our solution is that the adversarial perturbations
exhibit certain inherent characteristics that can represent their
transferability across different models. So we can build a
transferability-aware classifier (TC) to identify the relationship
and facilitate the generation of new perturbations based on our
demands. Our approach consists of two steps: (1) training a
TC; (2) generating non-transferable adversarial examples by
attacking on this classifier. Fig. 1 illustrates the methodology
overview.
A. Step 1: Training Transferability-aware Classifier
Without loss of generality, we consider two models: one is
attacked model (fattack) and another one is protected model
(fprotect). So there are four categories of adversarial examples:
(I) succeed in attacking both models; (II) succeed in attacking
fattack but fail to attack fprotect; (III) succeed in attacking
fprotect but fail to attack fattack; (IV) fail to attack both models.
The goal of this step is to train classifiers, such that given an
adversarial perturbation, they are able to predict which type
of attack results this perturbation belongs to without querying
the models.
Dataset preparation. We need a dataset to train the TC. We
prepare an assisted white-box model (fassist) which performs
the same task as fprotect and fattack. Then we generate a large
quantity of adversarial examples from fassist using conventional
methods (We use BIM [24] to generate AEs in this paper, but
other methods can be used in the same way). For each example,
we label them as one of the four categories defined above by
querying fprotect and fattack. Then we are able to synthesize a
four-class dataset with the added perturbation (δ) as the feature
and the attack result as the label. Note that this process can
give unbalanced samples and make the classifier biased. We
prune the dataset to guarantee each class has the same number
of samples.
Classifier training. We split this dataset as training set
and validation set, and train classifiers over them. We adopt
a DNN model, Resnet18 as the structure of our classifier.
Other networks can be used as well. Detailed experimental
configurations can be found in Section VI-A. We consider two
strategies: the first one is to train a unified classifier to predict
the samples from all classes of the target models. The second
one is to train a label-specific classifier for the samples from
each class. Table I reports the training and testing accuracy
of different combinations of white-box and target models. We
can observe that each type of classifier can achieve a very
satisfactory accuracy to differentiate four categories. The label-
specific classifiers have better performance. So we will adopt
this strategy in the follow evaluations.
TABLE I: Training and testing accuracy of our Transferability-
aware Classifier
White-box fassist Target fattack Target fprotect Classifier type Train acc Test acc
Resnet50 VGG16BN Densenet121 Label-specific 0.945 0.906Unified 0.750 0.748
VGG16BN Resnet50 Densenet121 Label-specific 0.968 0.922Unified 0.793 0.788
Densenet121 Resnet50 VGG16BN Label-specific 0.927 0.922Unified 0.793 0.788
B. Step 2: Generating Adversarial Examples from
Transferability-aware Classifier
With the trained TC we can easily generate adversarial ex-
amples can only attack fattack other than fprotect. Specifically,
given an input x, we use conventional methods to generate the
corresponding perturbation δ which the TC can give correct
prediction. If the perturbation can meet our demand (i.e., it
belongs to category II), then we will select it as the final result.
Otherwise, we treat this perturbation δ as the input sample of
the TC, and use conventional methods to generate a second
order of perturbation δδ that can shift the prediction result to
category II. Then we are able to get the final result x+ δ+ δδ
to satisfy our goal. We can use this adversarial sample to query
the two models for validation. We repeat the above process in
case the validation indicates the generated AE does not work
as expected.
Note that once we obtain the TC, normally we need to
run two generation sessions to identify the desired samples.
The first session is to generate the perturbation δ from the
assisted model fassist, which can converge in a few iteration.
The second session is to generate the perturbation δδ from TC.
This process needs dozens of iterations with a smaller , but
takes much shorter time due to the simple network structures
of TC. In contrast, the brute force needs to run a large number
of the first sessions to identify the satisfied AE. This makes
our solution much more efficient.
We use two models to describe our methodology. It can
be extended to multiple models: if there are n models in
the attacked and protected model sets, we need to build TC
with 2n labels to distinguish different sorts of perturbations,
and generate the perturbations in the category of attacking all
attacked models and bypassing all protected models.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Implementation and Experimental Configuration
Datasets and DL models. We mainly consider three
CNN models with different network structures: Resnet50
[25], VGG16 [26] and Densenet121 [27]. We select two
representative datasets for image classification: Cifar10 [28]
and Imagenet [29]. Other deep learning models and datasets
can be attacked in the same way. Cifar10 dataset contains
50,000 training samples and 10,000 testing samples of 10
classes. Each image has the size of 32× 32× 3. For Imagenet,
we select ILSVRC-2012 dataset, which contains more than
1.2 million training samples, 50,000 validation samples and
10,000 testing samples of 1,000 classes. The original images
vary in size, and we reshape them to 224× 224× 3.
Adversarial examples generation. We adopt Basic Iterative
Method (BIM) [24] to generate adversarial examples. It is the
basis of new transferable adversarial attack techniques, e.g., MI-
FGSM [2], TI-FGSM [3] DI2-FGSM [4]. We set a high noise
level ( = 32) to increase the transferability of the generated
adversarial examples. This can better reflect the effectiveness
of our solutions.
We implemented our attacks with PyTorch 1.3.1. All the
experiments in this paper were conducted on a server equipped
with 2 Intel Xeon Sliver 4214 CPUs and 1 NVIDIA 2080Ti
GPU.
B. White-box Attacks
Different structures. As the first study, we consider the
attacked and protected models with different network structures.
Table II shows the attack success rates of the attacked and
protected models with combinations of various structures. We
abbreviate Resnet50 as R50, VGG16 as V16, and Densenet121
as D121. For each entry, the left number denotes the success
rates of the two models when we generate AEs from the
attacked model and transfer them to the protected model
(baseline). The right number (bold) denotes the success rates
after we apply RLFE.
We get three observations from this table. First, RLFE gives
very satisfactory results: it can significantly decrease the attack
success rates of protected models, while still maintaining high
attack impacts on attacked models. Second, the attack results
are better for Imagenet than Cifar10. The non-transferability
is easier to achieve for more complicated images, as the
search space is larger. Third, RLFE can effectively handle
multiple models. We included two different models in the
protected model set, and the adversary can generate the
expected adversarial examples for both of the two models
with very low success rates.
TABLE II: Attack success rates of different network structures
under the white-box setting
(a) Cifar10
Attacked Model Protected Model
Structure Succ. Rate (%) Structure Succ. Rate (%)
R50 99.61 → 99.55 V16 74.78 → 1.24
R50 99.61 → 98.64 D121 79.83 → 1.61
R50 99.61 → 98.36 V16 74.78 → 1.05D121 79.83 → 1.59
V16 97.98 → 97.35 R50 43.18 → 0.28
V16 97.98 → 95.44 D121 46.13 → 0.31
V16 97.98 → 93.99 R50 43.18 → 0.17D121 46.13 → 0.14
D121 98.51 → 97.86 R50 77.54 → 2.77
D121 98.51 → 98.53 V16 79.60 → 2.50
D121 98.51 → 98.88 R50 77.54 → 2.47V16 79.60 → 1.85
(b) Imagenet
Attacked Model Protected Model
Structure Succ. Rate (%) Structure Succ. Rate (%)
R50 99.87 → 99.63 V16 50.28 → 0.58
R50 99.87 → 99.56 D121 51.31 → 0.19
R50 99.87 → 99.26 V16 50.28 → 0.70D121 51.31 → 0.20
V16 99.65 → 99.29 R50 37.93 → 0.22
V16 99.65 → 99.22 D121 39.20 → 0.11
V16 99.65 → 98.89 R50 37.93 → 0.20D121 39.20 → 0.13
D121 99.92 → 99.86 R50 52.83 → 0.29
D121 99.92 → 99.83 V16 51.42 → 0.05
D121 99.92 → 99.75 R50 52.83 → 0.28V16 51.42 → 0.04
Adversarial training. One possible defense against adver-
sarial attacks is adversarial training [30], [31], [32], where AEs
are used with normal samples together to train DNN models
to recognize and correct malicious samples. However, the new
model is still vulnerable to white-box attacks as the adversary
can generate new AEs based on this model. We further show
that with our RLFE method, the adversary can generate AEs
to only attack the models with adversarial training protection,
and protect the ones without AE protection.
Table III shows the transferability across attacked and
protected models. We can see that even after the model is
retrained with AEs, we can still generate new AEs to attack
the new model with very high success rate. These new AEs
have around 20% to 30% chances to affect the original model
as well. After we apply RLFE, we can decrease the success
rate on the original models to below 0.5%, without affecting
the attack effects on the retrained models. This confirms that
RLFE has the capability to attack the models with defenses
and protect the models without defenses.
TABLE III: Attack success rates of models w/ and w/o
adversarial protection under the white-box setting
(a) Cifar10
Structure
Attacked Model Protected Model
(w/ adv. training) (w/o adv. training)
Succ. Rate (%) Succ. Rate (%)
R50 99.74 → 98.31 18.25 → 0.05
V16 98.93 → 98.77 28.00 → 0.41
D121 99.95 → 99.45 22.19 → 0.13
(b) Imagenet
Structure
Attacked Model Protected Model
(w/ adv. training) (w/o adv. training)
Succ. Rate (%) Succ. Rate (%)
R50 99.98 → 97.09 26.87 → 0.02
V16 97.30 → 73.04 31.07 → 0.16
D121 95.89 → 96.33 24.96 → 0.01
C. Gray-box Attacks
Same model structure. Next we consider the gray-box
attacks. We assume the adversary has white-box access to the
attacked model, but gray-box access to the protected model.
He needs to train a shadow model with the same network
structure. In our experiment, we reset the logits layer’s weights
and retrain the model for 100 epochs as the shadow model.
Then the adversary can generate non-transferable AEs using
RLFE. Table IV reports the attack success rate of the attacked
model, and the protected model (not the shadow model).
We can observe that this RLFE with shadow model construc-
tion can significantly reduce the non-transferability as expected.
The attack effects are not as good as the white-box attacks, as
we generate the AEs from the shadow model instead of the
protected model. Besides, we also find that the attack effects
on Cifar10 is better than that on Imagenet. The reason is that
the Imagenet models are more complicated than the Cifar10
models, so the difference between constructed shadow and
original models is larger, making it harder to precisely protect
the original models against AEs.
Same model family. We consider another case of gray-box
scenario: the adversary does not know the network structure
of the protected model, but he knows which family this model
originates from. Then he can pick a random structure from
the same family to train the shadow model. In our experiment,
when the protected model is VGG16BN, the adversary can
use its variant, VGG11BN or VGG19BN for shadow model
construction. When the protected model is Resnet50, the
adversary can choose Resnet18 or Resnet34 from the same
family. Table V displays the attack results.
TABLE IV: Gray-box attacks: shadow model has the same
structure as the protected model
(a) Cifar10
Attacked Model Protected Model
Structure Succ. Rate (%) Structure Succ. Rate (%)
R50 99.61 → 99.44 V16 74.78 → 5.75
R50 99.61 → 99.28 D121 81.04 → 11.15
V16 97.98 → 91.67 R50 43.18 → 2.99
V16 97.98 → 91.71 D121 47.65 → 10.29
D121 99.15 → 94.16 R50 80.70 → 5.26
D121 99.15 → 96.97 V16 82.96 → 8.33
(b) Imagenet
Attacked Model Protected Model
Structure Accuracy Structure Accuracy
R50 99.87 → 99.28 V16 50.28 → 26.34
R50 99.87 → 91.62 D121 81.50 → 31.17
V16 99.65 → 97.67 R50 37.93 → 22.48
V16 99.65 → 88.07 D121 60.40 → 28.58
D121 99.78 → 98.49 R50 84.05 → 20.61
D121 99.78 → 99.71 V16 86.55 → 27.05
We can still observe the effectiveness of our solutions for
both high success rate of attacked models, and low success
rate of protected models. The results are worse than the attacks
with the same network structure. This is expected as different
structures can give larger discrepancy between the shadow and
original models, even they are from the same family.
TABLE V: Gray-box attacks:shadow model and protected
model are from the same family
(a) Cifar10
Attacked Model Protected Model
Structure Succ. Rate (%) Original Shadow Succ. Rate (%)Structure Structure
R50 99.61 → 99.48 V16 V11 74.78 → 41.82
R50 99.61 → 99.53 V16 V19 74.78 → 30.74
R50 99.61 → 99.36 V16 V11&V19 74.78 → 20.03
V16 97.98 → 96.77 R50 R18 43.18→ 19.65
V16 97.98 → 96.87 R50 R34 43.18→ 22.49
V16 97.98 → 95.24 R50 R18&R34 43.18→ 12.65
(b) Imagenet
Attacked Model Protected Model
Structure Succ. Rate (%) Original Shadow Succ. Rate (%)Structure Structure
R50 99.87→ 95.50 V16 V11 50.28 → 39.92
R50 99.87→ 99.64 V16 V19 50.28 → 37.73
R50 99.87→ 99.43 V16 V11&V19 50.28 → 32.86
V16 99.65 → 99.28 R50 R18 37.93 → 32.23
V16 99.65 → 99.22 R50 R34 37.93 → 31.98
V16 99.65 → 98.92 R50 R18&R34 37.93 → 28.51
D. Black-box Attacks
We evaluate the black-box attacks with the Transferability
Classification method. We set Densenet121 as the attacked
black-box model and VGG16BN as the protected black-box
model. The adversary adopts Resnet50 as the assisted white-
box model to generate AEs and train the TC. As mentioned in
section V-A, the classifiers are based on the Resnet18 structure.
We train one classifier for each class.
Table VI lists the attack results. We show all 10 classes of
Cifar10 and the first 10 classes of Imagenet. We observe that
the success rate of the attacked model has certain decrease
compared to white-box and gray-box attacks. This is because
the adversary cannot access the attacked model directly. He
has to identify the perturbation from the TC. This is already
a good attack performance for black-box setting. Besides, the
success rate of the protected model is reduced a lot, and
there are big gaps between the attacked model and protected
model. This proves the effectiveness of our Transferability
Classification method, and the possibility of non-transferability
adversarial attacks even all the models are black-box access to
the adversary.
TABLE VI: Results of black-box attacks using Transferability-
aware Classifier
(a) Cifar10
category Attacked Model Protected Model
0 82.86 → 54.08 83.24 → 13.86
1 87.72 → 52.90 87.54 → 11.99
2 76.98 → 47.21 75.70 → 15.04
3 71.90 → 53.57 69.04 → 14.93
4 75.60 → 52.14 70.72 → 14.94
5 75.10 → 60.27 72.12 → 14.46
6 83.58 → 53.28 79.80 → 13.77
7 85.38 → 53.90 82.56 → 14.05
8 89.12 → 53.59 86.90 → 15.05
9 80.18 → 48.48 85.52 → 18.19
(b) Imagenet
category Attacked Model Protected Model
0 53.22 → 47.24 61.39 → 23.31
1 49.73 → 51.99 48.08 → 18.20
2 65.52 → 54.29 58.45 → 21.92
3 49.73 → 44.21 48.68 → 19.24
4 47.38 → 49.10 51.10 → 17.77
5 58.03 → 52.91 46.99→ 18.97
6 62.31 → 57.31 58.33 → 25.05
7 48.46 → 42.91 59.32 → 18.28
8 55.89 → 50.45 48.49 → 19.49
9 55.11 → 57.91 66.66 → 21.44
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new form of non-transferable
adversarial examples, which can accurately attack a set of
models without compromising another sets of models, con-
trolled by the adversary. We introduce two methods to generate
such samples under different attack scenarios. The first one
is gradient-based approach: we identify a new loss function
considering both attacked and protected models. Then AEs
can be generated by maximizing this function and calculating
its gradients. The second one is perturbation-based approach:
we build a transferability-aware classifier to predict the attack
results of adversarial perturbations as well as generate desired
AEs. Our methods can efficiently produce accurate AEs with
the specified non-transferability. They are generous and can be
integrated with existing AE generation approaches.
VIII. BROADER IMPACT
In this work, we present the first systematic study about
the non-transferability feature of adversarial examples. Al-
though transferability makes AEs more severe and dangerous,
non-transferability can also enhance adversarial attacks, by
increasing the accuracy of target identification. This provides
a brand new attack scenario, particularly useful for target-
specific attacks between business competitors. Considering deep
learning has been widely commercialized into many safety-
and security-critical products (e.g., autonomous driving, face
authentication, anomaly detection, home automation, etc.), we
expect our methods can bring new challenges to deep learning
applications in real world.
For research, we expect our work can open a new direction
and draw researchers’ interests, just like the study of transfer-
ability over the past years. Specifically, we suggest some topics
and research questions, which deserve in-depth exploration in
the near future:
• Physical attacks: how can we generate physical perturba-
tions with such non-transferability to attack real-world deep
learning products?
• Advanced attacks: can we design advanced techniques to
further decrease the transferability across specific models
in a more efficient and scalable way?
• Defenses: can we prevent such highly targeted attacks, and
thwart the generation of non-transferable AEs?
• Explanation and quantification: how can we explain the non-
transferability feature? What properties of DNN models can
impact non-transferability? What is the relationship between
non-transferability and model similarity?
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